diff --git a/demo/README.md b/demo/README.md
index c46cc51..4509655 100644
--- a/demo/README.md
+++ b/demo/README.md
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ This folder contains only the self-contained Textual file-share demo.
 - `demo/file_share_tui.py`: Textual UI.
 - `demo/zkac_cli_adapter.py`: subprocess bridge to `zkac-node`.
 - `demo/file_share_smoke.py`: end-to-end smoke test.
+- `demo/test_demo_privacy_guardrails.py`: pytest privacy regressions for the demo.
 
 ## Run
 
@@ -38,4 +39,11 @@ local ZKAC usage.
 
 ```bash
 uv run python demo/file_share_smoke.py
+pytest demo/test_demo_privacy_guardrails.py
 ```
+
+## Future Work
+
+- Further reduce at-rest metadata by removing persisted raw role-id indexes used
+  for proof candidate discovery after restart, while preserving reliable auth
+  recovery semantics.
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diff --git a/demo/__pycache__/zkac_cli_adapter.cpython-314.pyc b/demo/__pycache__/zkac_cli_adapter.cpython-314.pyc
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diff --git a/demo/file_share_client.py b/demo/file_share_client.py
index 14224cb..9f71228 100644
--- a/demo/file_share_client.py
+++ b/demo/file_share_client.py
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ harness. The library performs:
 
 * deterministic folder flattening and per-file content-key generation,
 * per-role visibility bitmasks over the flattened index,
-* opaque blob and per-recipient role-grant uploads to ``file_share_server.py``,
+* opaque blob uploads to ``file_share_server.py``,
 * role-credential authenticated download + decrypt against the same server.
 
 Authenticated sessions piggy-back on the ZKAC TCP framing/handshake from
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ class BucketManifest:
     registry_id_hex: str
     files: list[FileEntry]
     role_masks: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)  # role -> bitmask string ('0'/'1')
-    recipients: list[dict] = field(default_factory=list)  # [{role_name, issuance_pk_hex}]
+    recipients: list[dict] = field(default_factory=list)  # local audit log only (no server identity binding)
 
     def to_dict(self) -> dict:
         return {
@@ -311,10 +311,17 @@ class FileShareSession:
             "ciphertext_b64": _b64(ciphertext),
         })
 
+    def bucket_set_role_acl(self, bucket_id: str, role_id_hex: str, allowed_blob_ids: list[str]) -> None:
+        self._call({
+            "cmd": "bucket_set_role_acl",
+            "bucket_id": bucket_id,
+            "role_id_hex": role_id_hex,
+            "allowed_blob_ids": allowed_blob_ids,
+        })
+
     def bucket_put_role_grant(
         self,
         bucket_id: str,
-        recipient_pk_hex: str,
         role_id_hex: str,
         acl_version: int,
         eph_pk_b64: str,
@@ -323,21 +330,12 @@ class FileShareSession:
         self._call({
             "cmd": "bucket_put_role_grant",
             "bucket_id": bucket_id,
-            "recipient_pk_hex": recipient_pk_hex,
             "role_id_hex": role_id_hex,
             "acl_version": int(acl_version),
             "eph_pk_b64": eph_pk_b64,
             "ciphertext_b64": ciphertext_b64,
         })
 
-    def bucket_set_role_acl(self, bucket_id: str, role_id_hex: str, allowed_blob_ids: list[str]) -> None:
-        self._call({
-            "cmd": "bucket_set_role_acl",
-            "bucket_id": bucket_id,
-            "role_id_hex": role_id_hex,
-            "allowed_blob_ids": allowed_blob_ids,
-        })
-
     def bucket_get_role_acl(self, bucket_id: str, role_id_hex: str) -> dict:
         return self._call({
             "cmd": "bucket_get_role_acl",
@@ -377,7 +375,6 @@ def open_session(
     registry_id_hex: str,
     role_id: bytes,
     credential: "zkac.Credential",
-    user_issuance_pk_hex: str,
     connect_timeout_s: float = DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_S,
 ) -> FileShareSession:
     """Connect, anonymous-handshake, then present a BBS+ proof bound to the transcript."""
@@ -393,10 +390,7 @@ def open_session(
         bbs_auth_proof = bytes(credential.present(transcript_hash))
         framed.send(json.dumps({
             "op": "fs",
-            "registry_id": registry_id_hex,
-            "role_id": role_id.hex(),
             "bbs_auth_b64": _b64(bbs_auth_proof),
-            "issuance_pk_hex": user_issuance_pk_hex,
         }).encode("utf-8"))
         hello = json.loads(framed.recv())
         if hello.get("error"):
@@ -436,40 +430,6 @@ def upload_bucket(
     )
 
 
-def push_role_grant(
-    sess: FileShareSession,
-    manifest: BucketManifest,
-    role_name: str,
-    recipient_issuance_pk_hex: str,
-) -> None:
-    """Encrypt the per-role visible-file subset to ``recipient`` and store on server."""
-    if role_name not in manifest.role_masks:
-        raise RuntimeError(f"role {role_name!r} has no visibility mask in this bucket")
-    mask = normalize_mask(manifest.role_masks[role_name], len(manifest.files))
-    visible = files_visible_to_mask(manifest.files, mask)
-    role_id_hex = zkac.role_id(role_name).hex()
-    acl_meta = sess.bucket_get_role_acl(manifest.bucket_id, role_id_hex)
-    acl_version = int(acl_meta.get("version", 0))
-    if acl_version <= 0:
-        raise RuntimeError("server ACL missing for role; apply permissions before sharing")
-    payload = encode_grant_payload(
-        manifest.bucket_id, role_name, manifest.server, manifest.registry_id_hex, visible,
-    )
-    eph_pk_b64, ct_b64 = encrypt_grant_to_recipient(payload, recipient_issuance_pk_hex)
-    sess.bucket_put_role_grant(
-        manifest.bucket_id,
-        recipient_issuance_pk_hex,
-        role_id_hex,
-        acl_version,
-        eph_pk_b64,
-        ct_b64,
-    )
-    manifest.recipients.append({
-        "role_name": role_name,
-        "issuance_pk_hex": recipient_issuance_pk_hex,
-    })
-
-
 def apply_role_masks_to_server(sess: FileShareSession, manifest: BucketManifest) -> None:
     """Push per-role blob ACLs so server enforces mask on fs_get_blob."""
     if not manifest.role_masks:
@@ -485,16 +445,63 @@ def apply_role_masks_to_server(sess: FileShareSession, manifest: BucketManifest)
         )
 
 
+def push_role_grant(
+    sess: FileShareSession,
+    manifest: BucketManifest,
+    role_name: str,
+    recipient_issuance_pk_hex: str,
+) -> None:
+    """Upload anonymous encrypted role grant envelope (no recipient identifier stored)."""
+    if role_name not in manifest.role_masks:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"role {role_name!r} has no visibility mask in this bucket")
+    mask = normalize_mask(manifest.role_masks[role_name], len(manifest.files))
+    visible = files_visible_to_mask(manifest.files, mask)
+    role_id_hex = zkac.role_id(role_name).hex()
+    acl_meta = sess.bucket_get_role_acl(manifest.bucket_id, role_id_hex)
+    acl_version = int(acl_meta.get("version", 0))
+    if acl_version <= 0:
+        raise RuntimeError("server ACL missing for role; apply permissions before sharing")
+    payload = encode_grant_payload(
+        manifest.bucket_id, role_name, manifest.server, manifest.registry_id_hex, visible,
+    )
+    eph_pk_b64, ct_b64 = encrypt_grant_to_recipient(payload, recipient_issuance_pk_hex)
+    sess.bucket_put_role_grant(
+        manifest.bucket_id,
+        role_id_hex,
+        acl_version,
+        eph_pk_b64,
+        ct_b64,
+    )
+    manifest.recipients.append({
+        "role_name": role_name,
+        "recipient_hint": recipient_issuance_pk_hex[:16],
+    })
+
+
 def download_bucket(
     sess: FileShareSession,
     bucket_id: str,
     *,
     issuance_secret_hex: str,
+    role_grant_payload: dict | None = None,
     output_dir: Path,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Fetch + decrypt every file the auth'd role has access to."""
-    grant = sess.fs_get_role_grant(bucket_id)
-    payload = decrypt_grant_for_recipient(grant["eph_pk_b64"], grant["ciphertext_b64"], issuance_secret_hex)
+    """Fetch + decrypt files from a role grant, optionally fetched from server."""
+    payload = role_grant_payload
+    if payload is None:
+        grants = sess.fs_get_role_grant(bucket_id).get("grants", [])
+        for grant in grants:
+            try:
+                payload = decrypt_grant_for_recipient(
+                    grant["eph_pk_b64"],
+                    grant["ciphertext_b64"],
+                    issuance_secret_hex,
+                )
+                break
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+        if payload is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("no decryptable role grant for this credential")
     if payload.get("bucket_id") != bucket_id:
         raise RuntimeError("role grant bucket_id mismatch")
     output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
@@ -510,6 +517,46 @@ def download_bucket(
     return {"role_name": payload.get("role_name"), "files_written": written}
 
 
+def _received_grant_path(userid: str, registry_id_hex: str, role_name: str, bucket_id: str) -> Path:
+    return state_dir(userid) / "received_grants" / registry_id_hex / role_name / f"{bucket_id}.json"
+
+
+def save_received_role_grant(
+    userid: str,
+    registry_id_hex: str,
+    role_name: str,
+    bucket_id: str,
+    *,
+    eph_pk_b64: str,
+    ciphertext_b64: str,
+) -> Path:
+    path = _received_grant_path(userid, registry_id_hex, role_name, bucket_id)
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    path.write_text(json.dumps({
+        "registry_id_hex": registry_id_hex,
+        "role_name": role_name,
+        "bucket_id": bucket_id,
+        "eph_pk_b64": eph_pk_b64,
+        "ciphertext_b64": ciphertext_b64,
+    }, indent=2))
+    try:
+        os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    return path
+
+
+def list_received_role_grants(userid: str, registry_id_hex: str, role_name: str) -> list[str]:
+    base = state_dir(userid) / "received_grants" / registry_id_hex / role_name
+    if not base.is_dir():
+        return []
+    return sorted(p.stem for p in base.glob("*.json"))
+
+
+def load_received_role_grant(userid: str, registry_id_hex: str, role_name: str, bucket_id: str) -> dict:
+    return json.loads(_received_grant_path(userid, registry_id_hex, role_name, bucket_id).read_text())
+
+
 # ── local persistence (admin manifests) ──────────────────────────────
 
 def state_dir(userid: str) -> Path:
diff --git a/demo/file_share_credentials.py b/demo/file_share_credentials.py
index 5ec959d..cba15f8 100644
--- a/demo/file_share_credentials.py
+++ b/demo/file_share_credentials.py
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 import zkac
 from zkac.tcp import FramedSession, client_handshake_anon
 
+import file_share_client as fsc
 import zkac_cli_adapter as cli
 
 
@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ def grant_role_p2p(
     role_name: str,
     recipient_contact_bundle: str,
     *,
+    bucket_role_grant: dict | None = None,
     connect_timeout_s: float = 8.0,
 ) -> dict:
     """Issue a BBS+ role credential and ship it to the recipient over an authenticated TCP session.
@@ -148,6 +150,7 @@ def grant_role_p2p(
         "blind_sig_b64": _b64(bytes(blind_sig)),
         "member_secret_b64": _b64(bytes(req.member_secret())),
         "prover_blind_b64": _b64(bytes(req.prover_blind())),
+        "bucket_role_grant": bucket_role_grant or None,
     }).encode()
 
     rec_pk_bytes = bytes.fromhex(recipient_issuance_pk_hex)
@@ -313,6 +316,20 @@ def listen_for_role_credential(
                     raise RuntimeError("granted credential does not verify")
 
                 _save_credential_json(userid, registry_id_hex, role_name, payload)
+                bucket_grant = payload.get("bucket_role_grant")
+                if isinstance(bucket_grant, dict):
+                    bucket_id = bucket_grant.get("bucket_id")
+                    eph_pk_b64 = bucket_grant.get("eph_pk_b64")
+                    ciphertext_b64 = bucket_grant.get("ciphertext_b64")
+                    if isinstance(bucket_id, str) and isinstance(eph_pk_b64, str) and isinstance(ciphertext_b64, str):
+                        fsc.save_received_role_grant(
+                            userid,
+                            registry_id_hex,
+                            role_name,
+                            bucket_id,
+                            eph_pk_b64=eph_pk_b64,
+                            ciphertext_b64=ciphertext_b64,
+                        )
                 framed.send(json.dumps({"ok": True, "status": "stored"}).encode())
                 return {"registry_id": registry_id_hex, "role": role_name}
             finally:
diff --git a/demo/file_share_server.py b/demo/file_share_server.py
index 20d016c..d58e5fb 100644
--- a/demo/file_share_server.py
+++ b/demo/file_share_server.py
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Headless TCP service that combines:
   ``zkac-node registry create/get/update`` commands work unchanged.
 * A new file-share channel that, after BBS+ role authentication, exposes
   bucket primitives. The server only ever sees opaque ciphertext blobs and
-  per-recipient encrypted role grants; file names, contents and per-role
+  encrypted role grants; file names, contents and per-role
   visibility masks are never visible server-side.
 
 Run with::
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import argparse
 import base64
+import hashlib
 import json
 import os
 import socket
 import sys
 import threading
-import traceback
 import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ def _safe_id(value: str) -> str:
     return value
 
 
+def _privacy_safe_error_tag(exc: BaseException) -> str:
+    """Return a coarse error label suitable for public service logs."""
+    return type(exc).__name__
+
+
 # ── opaque on-disk store ─────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 class _FileShareStore:
@@ -81,11 +86,39 @@ class _FileShareStore:
         self._dir = data_dir
         self._reg_dir = data_dir / "registries"
         self._buckets_dir = data_dir / "buckets"
+        self._privacy_key: bytes = b""
         for d in (self._dir, self._reg_dir, self._buckets_dir):
             d.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
             _chmod(d, 0o700)
         self._lock = threading.Lock()
 
+    def set_privacy_key(self, key: bytes) -> None:
+        if not key:
+            raise RuntimeError("privacy key must not be empty")
+        self._privacy_key = bytes(key)
+
+    def _require_privacy_key(self) -> bytes:
+        if not self._privacy_key:
+            raise RuntimeError("privacy key not initialized")
+        return self._privacy_key
+
+    def _tag(self, kind: str, raw_id: str) -> str:
+        key = self._require_privacy_key()
+        raw = _safe_id(raw_id).encode("utf-8")
+        h = hashlib.sha256()
+        h.update(kind.encode("utf-8"))
+        h.update(b"\x00")
+        h.update(key)
+        h.update(b"\x00")
+        h.update(raw)
+        return h.hexdigest()
+
+    def _registry_tag(self, registry_id_hex: str) -> str:
+        return self._tag("registry", registry_id_hex)
+
+    def _role_tag(self, role_id_hex: str) -> str:
+        return self._tag("role", role_id_hex)
+
     # transport key
 
     def load_or_create_keypair(self) -> zkac.Keypair:
@@ -120,6 +153,14 @@ class _FileShareStore:
                 print(f"[fs-server] skip registry {p.stem}: {exc}")
         return n
 
+    def list_registry_ids(self) -> list[str]:
+        out: list[str] = []
+        for p in sorted(self._reg_dir.glob("*.state")):
+            cert = self._reg_dir / f"{p.stem}.cert"
+            if cert.exists():
+                out.append(p.stem)
+        return out
+
     # buckets
 
     def _bucket_dir(self, bucket_id: str) -> Path:
@@ -128,6 +169,22 @@ class _FileShareStore:
     def _bucket_meta_path(self, bucket_id: str) -> Path:
         return self._bucket_dir(bucket_id) / "meta.json"
 
+    def _roles_index_path(self, registry_id_hex: str) -> Path:
+        return self._reg_dir / f"{_safe_id(registry_id_hex)}.roles.json"
+
+    def _remember_role_id(self, registry_id_hex: str, role_id_hex: str) -> None:
+        p = self._roles_index_path(registry_id_hex)
+        roles: set[str] = set()
+        if p.is_file():
+            try:
+                data = json.loads(p.read_text())
+                if isinstance(data, list):
+                    roles = {_safe_id(str(v)) for v in data}
+            except Exception:
+                roles = set()
+        roles.add(_safe_id(role_id_hex))
+        _write_private_json(p, sorted(roles))
+
     def bucket_create(self, bucket_id: str, owner_registry_id_hex: str) -> None:
         bd = self._bucket_dir(bucket_id)
         with self._lock:
@@ -138,17 +195,21 @@ class _FileShareStore:
             _chmod(bd, 0o700)
             _write_private_json(self._bucket_meta_path(bucket_id), {
                 "bucket_id": bucket_id,
-                "owner_registry_id": owner_registry_id_hex,
+                "owner_registry_tag": self._registry_tag(owner_registry_id_hex),
                 "finalized": False,
-                "role_acl": {},  # role_id_hex -> {"version": int, "allowed_blob_ids": [blob_id...]}
+                "role_acl": {},  # role_tag -> {"version": int, "allowed_blob_ids": [blob_id...]}
             })
 
     def bucket_meta(self, bucket_id: str) -> dict:
         return json.loads(self._bucket_meta_path(bucket_id).read_text())
 
+    def bucket_is_finalized(self, bucket_id: str) -> bool:
+        return bool(self.bucket_meta(bucket_id).get("finalized", False))
+
     def _bucket_require_owner(self, bucket_id: str, registry_id_hex: str) -> dict:
         meta = self.bucket_meta(bucket_id)
-        if meta.get("owner_registry_id") != registry_id_hex:
+        expected_owner_tag = self._registry_tag(registry_id_hex)
+        if meta.get("owner_registry_tag") != expected_owner_tag:
             raise RuntimeError("not bucket owner")
         return meta
 
@@ -165,11 +226,18 @@ class _FileShareStore:
             for sub in ("blobs", "role_grants"):
                 d = bd / sub
                 if d.is_dir():
-                    for p in d.iterdir():
-                        try:
-                            p.unlink()
-                        except OSError:
-                            pass
+                    for p in d.rglob("*"):
+                        if p.is_file():
+                            try:
+                                p.unlink()
+                            except OSError:
+                                pass
+                    for p in sorted(d.rglob("*"), reverse=True):
+                        if p.is_dir():
+                            try:
+                                p.rmdir()
+                            except OSError:
+                                pass
                     try:
                         d.rmdir()
                     except OSError:
@@ -194,29 +262,6 @@ class _FileShareStore:
             self._bucket_require_owner(bucket_id, registry_id_hex)
             (self._bucket_dir(bucket_id) / "blobs" / _safe_id(blob_id)).write_bytes(ciphertext)
 
-    def bucket_put_role_grant(
-        self,
-        bucket_id: str,
-        registry_id_hex: str,
-        recipient_pk_hex: str,
-        role_id_hex: str,
-        acl_version: int,
-        eph_pk_b64: str,
-        ciphertext_b64: str,
-    ) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._bucket_require_owner(bucket_id, registry_id_hex)
-            _safe_id(recipient_pk_hex)
-            payload = {
-                "bucket_id": bucket_id,
-                "role_id_hex": _safe_id(role_id_hex),
-                "acl_version": int(acl_version),
-                "eph_pk_b64": eph_pk_b64,
-                "ciphertext_b64": ciphertext_b64,
-            }
-            target = self._bucket_dir(bucket_id) / "role_grants" / f"{recipient_pk_hex}.json"
-            _write_private_json(target, payload)
-
     def bucket_set_role_acl(
         self,
         bucket_id: str,
@@ -227,7 +272,7 @@ class _FileShareStore:
         with self._lock:
             meta = self._bucket_require_owner(bucket_id, registry_id_hex)
             role_acl = dict(meta.get("role_acl", {}))
-            key = _safe_id(role_id_hex)
+            key = self._role_tag(role_id_hex)
             prev = role_acl.get(key, {})
             prev_version = int(prev.get("version", 0)) if isinstance(prev, dict) else 0
             role_acl[key] = {
@@ -236,6 +281,7 @@ class _FileShareStore:
             }
             meta["role_acl"] = role_acl
             _write_private_json(self._bucket_meta_path(bucket_id), meta)
+            self._remember_role_id(registry_id_hex, role_id_hex)
 
     def bucket_get_blob(self, bucket_id: str, blob_id: str) -> bytes:
         return (self._bucket_dir(bucket_id) / "blobs" / _safe_id(blob_id)).read_bytes()
@@ -243,7 +289,7 @@ class _FileShareStore:
     def bucket_blob_allowed_for_role(self, bucket_id: str, role_id_hex: str, blob_id: str) -> bool:
         meta = self.bucket_meta(bucket_id)
         role_acl = meta.get("role_acl", {})
-        role_meta = role_acl.get(_safe_id(role_id_hex))
+        role_meta = role_acl.get(self._role_tag(role_id_hex))
         if not isinstance(role_meta, dict):
             return False
         allowed = role_meta.get("allowed_blob_ids")
@@ -254,7 +300,7 @@ class _FileShareStore:
     def bucket_role_acl(self, bucket_id: str, role_id_hex: str) -> dict:
         meta = self.bucket_meta(bucket_id)
         role_acl = meta.get("role_acl", {})
-        role_meta = role_acl.get(_safe_id(role_id_hex), {})
+        role_meta = role_acl.get(self._role_tag(role_id_hex), {})
         if not isinstance(role_meta, dict):
             return {"version": 0, "allowed_blob_ids": []}
         version = int(role_meta.get("version", 0))
@@ -266,20 +312,75 @@ class _FileShareStore:
             "allowed_blob_ids": [_safe_id(str(v)) for v in allowed],
         }
 
-    def bucket_get_role_grant(self, bucket_id: str, recipient_pk_hex: str) -> dict:
-        path = self._bucket_dir(bucket_id) / "role_grants" / f"{_safe_id(recipient_pk_hex)}.json"
-        return json.loads(path.read_text())
-
-    def buckets_for_recipient(self, recipient_pk_hex: str) -> list[str]:
-        """Bucket ids that have an encrypted role grant addressed to ``recipient_pk_hex``."""
-        _safe_id(recipient_pk_hex)
+    def buckets_for_role_in_registry(self, role_id_hex: str, registry_id_hex: str) -> list[str]:
+        """Bucket ids where this authenticated role currently has non-empty ACL."""
+        role_id_hex = _safe_id(role_id_hex)
         out: list[str] = []
         for bd in sorted(self._buckets_dir.iterdir()):
-            grant = bd / "role_grants" / f"{recipient_pk_hex}.json"
-            if grant.is_file():
-                out.append(bd.name)
+            bid = bd.name
+            try:
+                if not self.bucket_is_finalized(bid):
+                    continue
+                if self.bucket_owner_registry_tag(bid) != self._registry_tag(registry_id_hex):
+                    continue
+                acl = self.bucket_role_acl(bid, role_id_hex)
+                allowed = acl.get("allowed_blob_ids", [])
+                grants = self.bucket_get_role_grants(bid, role_id_hex)
+                current_acl_version = int(acl.get("version", -1))
+                has_fresh_grant = any(
+                    isinstance(g.get("acl_version"), int) and g["acl_version"] == current_acl_version
+                    for g in grants
+                )
+                if isinstance(allowed, list) and len(allowed) > 0 and has_fresh_grant:
+                    out.append(bid)
+            except Exception:
+                continue
         return out
 
+    def bucket_put_role_grant(
+        self,
+        bucket_id: str,
+        registry_id_hex: str,
+        role_id_hex: str,
+        acl_version: int,
+        eph_pk_b64: str,
+        ciphertext_b64: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._bucket_require_owner(bucket_id, registry_id_hex)
+            role_id_hex = _safe_id(role_id_hex)
+            role_tag = self._role_tag(role_id_hex)
+            payload = {
+                "bucket_id": bucket_id,
+                "role_tag": role_tag,
+                "acl_version": int(acl_version),
+                "eph_pk_b64": eph_pk_b64,
+                "ciphertext_b64": ciphertext_b64,
+            }
+            role_dir = self._bucket_dir(bucket_id) / "role_grants" / role_tag
+            role_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            target = role_dir / f"{uuid.uuid4().hex}.json"
+            _write_private_json(target, payload)
+            self._remember_role_id(registry_id_hex, role_id_hex)
+
+    def bucket_get_role_grants(self, bucket_id: str, role_id_hex: str) -> list[dict]:
+        role_dir = self._bucket_dir(bucket_id) / "role_grants" / self._role_tag(role_id_hex)
+        if not role_dir.is_dir():
+            return []
+        out: list[dict] = []
+        for p in sorted(role_dir.glob("*.json")):
+            try:
+                out.append(json.loads(p.read_text()))
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+        return out
+
+    def bucket_owner_registry_tag(self, bucket_id: str) -> str:
+        owner = self.bucket_meta(bucket_id).get("owner_registry_tag")
+        if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner:
+            raise RuntimeError("bucket metadata missing owner_registry_tag")
+        return owner
+
     def buckets_owned_by(self, registry_id_hex: str) -> list[str]:
         out: list[str] = []
         for bd in sorted(self._buckets_dir.iterdir()):
@@ -287,12 +388,25 @@ class _FileShareStore:
             if not meta.is_file():
                 continue
             try:
-                if json.loads(meta.read_text()).get("owner_registry_id") == registry_id_hex:
+                owner_tag = self._registry_tag(registry_id_hex)
+                if json.loads(meta.read_text()).get("owner_registry_tag") == owner_tag:
                     out.append(bd.name)
             except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
                 continue
         return out
 
+    def role_ids_for_registry(self, registry_id_hex: str) -> list[str]:
+        p = self._roles_index_path(registry_id_hex)
+        if not p.is_file():
+            return []
+        try:
+            data = json.loads(p.read_text())
+            if not isinstance(data, list):
+                return []
+            return sorted({_safe_id(str(v)) for v in data})
+        except Exception:
+            return []
+
 
 # ── command dispatch (inside encrypted session) ──────────────────────
 
@@ -378,13 +492,13 @@ def _dispatch_fs(
     store: _FileShareStore,
     ctx: dict,
 ) -> dict:
-    """File-share commands authenticated via ``ctx`` (registry_id, role_id, issuance_pk_hex)."""
+    """File-share commands authenticated via opaque per-session authorization context."""
     try:
         action = cmd.get("cmd")
         registry_id_hex: str = ctx["registry_id_hex"]
-        role_id: bytes = ctx["role_id"]
-        issuance_pk_hex: str = ctx["issuance_pk_hex"]
-        is_admin = role_id == zkac.admin_role_id()
+        registry_tag: str = ctx["registry_tag"]
+        role_id_hex: str = ctx["role_id_hex"]
+        is_admin: bool = bool(ctx["is_admin"])
 
         def _require_admin() -> None:
             if not is_admin:
@@ -393,10 +507,8 @@ def _dispatch_fs(
         if action == "whoami":
             return {
                 "ok": True,
-                "registry_id": registry_id_hex,
-                "role_id": role_id.hex(),
                 "is_admin": is_admin,
-                "issuance_pk_hex": issuance_pk_hex,
+                "auth_scope": "admin" if is_admin else "credential",
             }
 
         if action == "bucket_create":
@@ -413,19 +525,6 @@ def _dispatch_fs(
             store.bucket_put_blob(bid, registry_id_hex, blob_id, ciphertext)
             return {"ok": True}
 
-        if action == "bucket_put_role_grant":
-            _require_admin()
-            store.bucket_put_role_grant(
-                cmd["bucket_id"],
-                registry_id_hex,
-                cmd["recipient_pk_hex"],
-                cmd["role_id_hex"],
-                int(cmd["acl_version"]),
-                cmd["eph_pk_b64"],
-                cmd["ciphertext_b64"],
-            )
-            return {"ok": True}
-
         if action == "bucket_set_role_acl":
             _require_admin()
             store.bucket_set_role_acl(
@@ -436,6 +535,18 @@ def _dispatch_fs(
             )
             return {"ok": True}
 
+        if action == "bucket_put_role_grant":
+            _require_admin()
+            store.bucket_put_role_grant(
+                cmd["bucket_id"],
+                registry_id_hex,
+                cmd["role_id_hex"],
+                int(cmd["acl_version"]),
+                cmd["eph_pk_b64"],
+                cmd["ciphertext_b64"],
+            )
+            return {"ok": True}
+
         if action == "bucket_get_role_acl":
             _require_admin()
             role_acl = store.bucket_role_acl(cmd["bucket_id"], cmd["role_id_hex"])
@@ -456,31 +567,38 @@ def _dispatch_fs(
             return {"ok": True, "bucket_ids": store.buckets_owned_by(registry_id_hex)}
 
         if action == "fs_buckets":
-            return {"ok": True, "bucket_ids": store.buckets_for_recipient(issuance_pk_hex)}
+            return {
+                "ok": True,
+                "bucket_ids": store.buckets_for_role_in_registry(
+                    role_id_hex,
+                    registry_id_hex,
+                ),
+            }
 
         if action == "fs_get_role_grant":
             bid = cmd["bucket_id"]
-            grant = store.bucket_get_role_grant(bid, issuance_pk_hex)
-            if not is_admin:
-                expected_role = _safe_id(role_id.hex())
-                granted_role_raw = grant.get("role_id_hex")
-                if not isinstance(granted_role_raw, str) or not granted_role_raw:
-                    raise RuntimeError("permissions updated; role grant is outdated, request a fresh grant")
-                granted_role = _safe_id(granted_role_raw)
-                if granted_role != expected_role:
-                    raise RuntimeError("role grant not valid for authenticated role")
-                current_acl = store.bucket_role_acl(bid, expected_role)
-                acl_version = grant.get("acl_version")
-                if not isinstance(acl_version, int):
-                    raise RuntimeError("permissions updated; role grant is outdated, request a fresh grant")
-                if acl_version != int(current_acl.get("version", -2)):
-                    raise RuntimeError("permissions updated; request a fresh role grant")
-            return {"ok": True, **grant}
+            if store.bucket_owner_registry_tag(bid) != registry_tag:
+                raise RuntimeError("bucket does not belong to authenticated registry")
+            if not store.bucket_is_finalized(bid):
+                raise RuntimeError("bucket is not finalized")
+            current_acl = store.bucket_role_acl(bid, role_id_hex)
+            acl_version = int(current_acl.get("version", -1))
+            grants = [
+                g for g in store.bucket_get_role_grants(bid, role_id_hex)
+                if isinstance(g.get("acl_version"), int) and g["acl_version"] == acl_version
+            ]
+            if not grants:
+                raise RuntimeError("permissions updated; request a fresh role grant")
+            return {"ok": True, "grants": grants}
 
         if action == "fs_get_blob":
             bid = cmd["bucket_id"]
             blob_id = cmd["blob_id"]
-            if not is_admin and not store.bucket_blob_allowed_for_role(bid, role_id.hex(), blob_id):
+            if store.bucket_owner_registry_tag(bid) != registry_tag:
+                raise RuntimeError("bucket does not belong to authenticated registry")
+            if not store.bucket_is_finalized(bid):
+                raise RuntimeError("bucket is not finalized")
+            if not is_admin and not store.bucket_blob_allowed_for_role(bid, role_id_hex, blob_id):
                 raise RuntimeError("blob access denied by role mask")
             data = store.bucket_get_blob(bid, blob_id)
             return {"ok": True, "ciphertext_b64": _b64(data)}
@@ -491,6 +609,61 @@ def _dispatch_fs(
         return {"error": str(exc)}
 
 
+def _authenticate_fs_identity(
+    mgr: zkac.RegistryManager,
+    store: _FileShareStore,
+    proof: bytes,
+    transcript_hash: bytes,
+) -> dict[str, object] | None:
+    """Resolve opaque auth context from proof without client-supplied identifiers."""
+    registry_ids = store.list_registry_ids()
+    admin_matches: list[str] = []
+    role_matches: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+    for rid_hex in registry_ids:
+        try:
+            rid = bytes.fromhex(rid_hex)
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        try:
+            if mgr.verify_admin(rid, proof, transcript_hash):
+                admin_matches.append(rid_hex)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        for role_id_hex in store.role_ids_for_registry(rid_hex):
+            try:
+                role_id = bytes.fromhex(role_id_hex)
+            except ValueError:
+                continue
+            if role_id == zkac.admin_role_id():
+                continue
+            try:
+                if mgr.verify_presentation(rid, role_id, proof, transcript_hash):
+                    role_matches.append((rid_hex, role_id_hex))
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+    if len(admin_matches) == 1 and not role_matches:
+        rid_hex = admin_matches[0]
+        role_hex = zkac.admin_role_id().hex()
+        return {
+            "registry_id_hex": rid_hex,
+            "registry_tag": store._registry_tag(rid_hex),
+            "role_id_hex": role_hex,
+            "role_tag": store._role_tag(role_hex),
+            "is_admin": True,
+        }
+    if not admin_matches and len(role_matches) == 1:
+        rid_hex, role_hex = role_matches[0]
+        return {
+            "registry_id_hex": rid_hex,
+            "registry_tag": store._registry_tag(rid_hex),
+            "role_id_hex": role_hex,
+            "role_tag": store._role_tag(role_hex),
+            "is_admin": False,
+        }
+    # Ambiguous or invalid proof.
+    return None
+
+
 # ── per-connection handler ────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 def _handle_conn(
@@ -503,7 +676,6 @@ def _handle_conn(
     idle_timeout_s: float,
     slots: threading.BoundedSemaphore,
 ) -> None:
-    peer = f"{addr[0]}:{addr[1]}"
     try:
         conn.settimeout(idle_timeout_s)
         session = server_handshake_anon(conn, node)
@@ -525,27 +697,16 @@ def _handle_conn(
 
         if op == "fs":
             try:
-                registry_id = bytes.fromhex(hello["registry_id"])
-                role_id = bytes.fromhex(hello["role_id"])
                 proof = _unb64(hello["bbs_auth_b64"])
-                issuance_pk_hex = hello["issuance_pk_hex"]
-                _safe_id(issuance_pk_hex)
             except (KeyError, ValueError) as exc:
                 framed.send(json.dumps({"error": f"invalid fs hello: {exc}"}).encode())
                 return
-            if role_id == zkac.admin_role_id():
-                ok = mgr.verify_admin(registry_id, proof, transcript_hash)
-            else:
-                ok = mgr.verify_presentation(registry_id, role_id, proof, transcript_hash)
-            if not ok:
+            auth = _authenticate_fs_identity(mgr, store, proof, transcript_hash)
+            if auth is None:
                 framed.send(json.dumps({"error": "auth failed"}).encode())
                 return
             framed.send(json.dumps({"ok": True, "status": "authenticated"}).encode())
-            ctx = {
-                "registry_id_hex": registry_id.hex(),
-                "role_id": role_id,
-                "issuance_pk_hex": issuance_pk_hex,
-            }
+            ctx = auth
             while True:
                 try:
                     cmd = json.loads(framed.recv())
@@ -560,8 +721,8 @@ def _handle_conn(
     except (ConnectionError, BrokenPipeError, OSError):
         pass
     except Exception as exc:
-        print(f"[fs-server] {peer} error: {exc}")
-        traceback.print_exc()
+        # Privacy model: never emit client endpoint or request-linked payloads.
+        print(f"[fs-server] connection error ({_privacy_safe_error_tag(exc)})")
     finally:
         conn.close()
         slots.release()
@@ -582,6 +743,7 @@ def serve(
     data_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     store = _FileShareStore(data_dir)
     kp = store.load_or_create_keypair()
+    store.set_privacy_key(bytes(kp.secret_key_bytes()))
     server_pk_b64 = _b64(kp.public_key().to_bytes())
     pk_hex = kp.public_key().to_bytes().hex()
     node = zkac.Node(kp)
diff --git a/demo/file_share_smoke.py b/demo/file_share_smoke.py
index 1f4ba86..4ff4b8b 100644
--- a/demo/file_share_smoke.py
+++ b/demo/file_share_smoke.py
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Exercises:
 * admin (Alice) creates a registry on the file-share server,
 * admin uploads a folder as an encrypted bucket with per-role visibility masks,
 * Alice issues a ZKAC role credential to Bob via direct P2P grant,
-* Alice pushes a per-recipient bucket role grant to Bob,
+* Alice uploads an anonymous role-grant envelope to the server,
 * Bob authenticates to the file-share server with his role credential,
   downloads, and decrypts the files his role can see,
 * server opacity: every byte at rest in the bucket directory is ciphertext
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ def _open_admin_session(userid: str, server: str, server_pk_hex: str, registry_i
         registry_id_hex=registry_id,
         role_id=zkac.admin_role_id(),
         credential=cred,
-        user_issuance_pk_hex=secrets["issuance_pk_hex"],
     )
 
 
@@ -122,7 +121,6 @@ def _open_role_session(userid: str, server: str, server_pk_hex: str, registry_id
         registry_id_hex=registry_id,
         role_id=zkac.role_id(role_name),
         credential=cred,
-        user_issuance_pk_hex=secrets["issuance_pk_hex"],
     )
 
 
@@ -182,8 +180,33 @@ def main() -> int:
         raise RuntimeError("bob listener did not start")
     bob_contact = cli.show_user_contact("bob", peer=f"127.0.0.1:{listener_port}")
     print(f"[smoke] bob listening on 127.0.0.1:{listener_port}")
+    # --- alice uploads bucket + sets masks --------------------------------
+    files_in_order = fsc.flatten_folder(src)
+    rel_paths = [str(p.relative_to(src.resolve())) for p in files_in_order]
+    print(f"[smoke] flattened: {rel_paths}")
+    # mask: viewer sees only first file (alpha.txt), editor sees everything.
+    viewer_mask = "1" + "0" * (len(files_in_order) - 1)
+    editor_mask = "1" * len(files_in_order)
+    bob_secrets = cli.load_identity_secrets("bob")
+
+    with _open_admin_session("alice", server_addr, server_pk_hex, rid) as sess:
+        manifest = fsc.upload_bucket(
+            sess, src, server=server_addr, registry_id_hex=rid,
+        )
+        manifest.role_masks = {"viewer": viewer_mask, "editor": editor_mask}
+        fsc.apply_role_masks_to_server(sess, manifest)
+        fsc.push_role_grant(sess, manifest, "viewer", bob_secrets["issuance_pk_hex"])
+        fsc.save_manifest("alice", manifest)
+    print(f"[smoke] uploaded bucket {manifest.bucket_id} with role ACLs + anonymous grant envelope")
+
     try:
-        fscred.grant_role_p2p("alice", server_addr, rid, "viewer", bob_contact)
+        fscred.grant_role_p2p(
+            "alice",
+            server_addr,
+            rid,
+            "viewer",
+            bob_contact,
+        )
     except RuntimeError as exc:
         listener.stop()
         print(f"[smoke] grant failed: {exc}\n[smoke] bob listener output:\n{listener.output()}")
@@ -196,25 +219,6 @@ def main() -> int:
     assert received and received["role"] == "viewer"
     assert received["registry_id"] == rid
 
-    # --- alice uploads bucket + sets masks --------------------------------
-    files_in_order = fsc.flatten_folder(src)
-    rel_paths = [str(p.relative_to(src.resolve())) for p in files_in_order]
-    print(f"[smoke] flattened: {rel_paths}")
-    # mask: viewer sees only first file (alpha.txt), editor sees everything.
-    viewer_mask = "1" + "0" * (len(files_in_order) - 1)
-    editor_mask = "1" * len(files_in_order)
-
-    with _open_admin_session("alice", server_addr, server_pk_hex, rid) as sess:
-        manifest = fsc.upload_bucket(
-            sess, src, server=server_addr, registry_id_hex=rid,
-        )
-        manifest.role_masks = {"viewer": viewer_mask, "editor": editor_mask}
-        # bob's issuance pk -> push viewer role grant
-        bob_secrets = cli.load_identity_secrets("bob")
-        fsc.push_role_grant(sess, manifest, "viewer", bob_secrets["issuance_pk_hex"])
-        fsc.save_manifest("alice", manifest)
-    print(f"[smoke] uploaded bucket {manifest.bucket_id} with role grants")
-
     # --- bob downloads using his viewer credential ------------------------
     with _open_role_session("bob", server_addr, server_pk_hex, rid, "viewer") as sess:
         accessible = sess.fs_buckets()
diff --git a/demo/file_share_tui.py b/demo/file_share_tui.py
index 4db6be9..557459b 100644
--- a/demo/file_share_tui.py
+++ b/demo/file_share_tui.py
@@ -352,7 +352,6 @@ class FileShareApp(App[None]):
             registry_id_hex=registry_id_hex,
             role_id=role_id,
             credential=credential,
-            user_issuance_pk_hex=ident.issuance_pk_hex,
         )
 
     async def _choose_index(self, title: str, options: list[str], default: int = 1) -> int:
@@ -713,7 +712,7 @@ class FileShareApp(App[None]):
             fsc.push_role_grant(sess, manifest, role, recipient_pk_hex)
         fsc.save_manifest(ident.userid, manifest)
         self.current_bucket_id = manifest.bucket_id
-        self.write_log(f"[share] pushed bucket grant to {recipient_pk_hex[:16]}...")
+        self.write_log("[share] uploaded anonymous role-grant envelope (no recipient identifier on server)")
 
     async def menu_listen(self) -> None:
         ident = self._require_user()
@@ -781,8 +780,9 @@ class FileShareApp(App[None]):
         with self._open_session(cred["registry_id"], cred["role"]) as sess:
             who = sess.whoami()
             self.write_log(
-                f"[inbox] authenticated registry={who['registry_id'][:16]}... "
-                f"role_id={who['role_id'][:16]}..."
+                "[inbox] authenticated "
+                f"scope={who.get('auth_scope', 'unknown')} "
+                f"admin={bool(who.get('is_admin', False))}"
             )
             if cred["role"] == "__admin__":
                 bids = sess.bucket_list_owned()
diff --git a/demo/fs_data/registries/519bc59c917f122245d5a6a131ec42f5e3b57ae0b73c8b99a4e0cafc9c3eedab.state b/demo/fs_data/registries/519bc59c917f122245d5a6a131ec42f5e3b57ae0b73c8b99a4e0cafc9c3eedab.state
deleted file mode 100644
index 1a99c49..0000000
Binary files a/demo/fs_data/registries/519bc59c917f122245d5a6a131ec42f5e3b57ae0b73c8b99a4e0cafc9c3eedab.state and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/demo/fs_data/registries/a0e5ed90dafc9ddfa18197b599a63ea5bc43228a3cf1d5f64a043994951c31ea.cert b/demo/fs_data/registries/a0e5ed90dafc9ddfa18197b599a63ea5bc43228a3cf1d5f64a043994951c31ea.cert
deleted file mode 100644
index 0820bfd..0000000
Binary files a/demo/fs_data/registries/a0e5ed90dafc9ddfa18197b599a63ea5bc43228a3cf1d5f64a043994951c31ea.cert and /dev/null differ
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diff --git a/demo/test_demo_privacy_guardrails.py b/demo/test_demo_privacy_guardrails.py
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/demo/test_demo_privacy_guardrails.py
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+import json
+import sys
+import threading
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import zkac
+
+DEMO_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+if str(DEMO_DIR) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(DEMO_DIR))
+
+import file_share_client as fsc  # noqa: E402
+import file_share_server as fss  # noqa: E402
+
+
+def _make_credential() -> tuple[bytes, zkac.Credential]:
+    issuer = zkac.BbsIssuer()
+    pk = issuer.public_key()
+    role_id = zkac.role_id("viewer")
+    req = zkac.prepare_blind_request()
+    blind_sig = issuer.issue_blind(req.commitment_with_proof(), role_id, 1)
+    cred = zkac.Credential.finalize(
+        blind_sig,
+        req.member_secret(),
+        req.prover_blind(),
+        role_id,
+        1,
+        pk,
+    )
+    return role_id, cred
+
+
+def test_open_session_fs_hello_contains_only_proof(monkeypatch):
+    role_id, credential = _make_credential()
+    sent_payloads: list[dict] = []
+
+    class _FakeSocket:
+        def settimeout(self, _value):
+            return None
+
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    class _FakeHandshakeSession:
+        def transcript_hash(self) -> bytes:
+            return b"\x11" * 32
+
+    class _FakeFramedSession:
+        def __init__(self, _sock, _session):
+            pass
+
+        def send(self, payload: bytes) -> None:
+            sent_payloads.append(json.loads(payload.decode("utf-8")))
+
+        def recv(self) -> bytes:
+            return b'{"ok": true, "status": "authenticated"}'
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(fsc.socket, "create_connection", lambda *_args, **_kwargs: _FakeSocket())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(fsc, "client_handshake_anon", lambda *_args, **_kwargs: _FakeHandshakeSession())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(fsc, "FramedSession", _FakeFramedSession)
+
+    sess = fsc.open_session(
+        "127.0.0.1:9879",
+        server_pk_hex=zkac.Keypair().public_key().to_bytes().hex(),
+        user_transport_secret=bytes(zkac.Keypair().secret_key_bytes()),
+        registry_id_hex="00" * 32,
+        role_id=role_id,
+        credential=credential,
+    )
+    sess.close()
+
+    assert len(sent_payloads) == 1
+    hello = sent_payloads[0]
+    assert set(hello.keys()) == {"op", "bbs_auth_b64"}
+    assert hello["op"] == "fs"
+    assert isinstance(hello["bbs_auth_b64"], str) and hello["bbs_auth_b64"]
+
+
+def test_handle_conn_error_log_never_includes_peer_endpoint(monkeypatch, tmp_path, capsys):
+    class _DummyConn:
+        def settimeout(self, _value):
+            return None
+
+        def close(self):
+            return None
+
+    def _raise_handshake(_conn, _node):
+        raise RuntimeError("boom")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(fss, "server_handshake_anon", _raise_handshake)
+
+    slots = threading.BoundedSemaphore(1)
+    assert slots.acquire(blocking=False)
+
+    fss._handle_conn(
+        _DummyConn(),
+        ("203.0.113.44", 4242),
+        zkac.Node(zkac.Keypair()),
+        zkac.RegistryManager(),
+        fss._FileShareStore(tmp_path),
+        "",
+        5.0,
+        slots,
+    )
+
+    out = capsys.readouterr().out
+    assert "[fs-server] connection error (RuntimeError)" in out
+    assert "203.0.113.44" not in out
+    assert ":4242" not in out
+
+
+def test_bucket_metadata_uses_opaque_tags(tmp_path):
+    store = fss._FileShareStore(tmp_path)
+    store.set_privacy_key(b"privacy-key-32-bytes-minimum-seed")
+    registry_id = "aa" * 32
+    role_id = "bb" * 32
+    bucket_id = "cc" * 16
+    blob_id = "dd" * 16
+
+    store.bucket_create(bucket_id, registry_id)
+    meta = store.bucket_meta(bucket_id)
+    assert "owner_registry_id" not in meta
+    assert isinstance(meta.get("owner_registry_tag"), str)
+    assert len(meta["owner_registry_tag"]) == 64
+
+    store.bucket_set_role_acl(bucket_id, registry_id, role_id, [blob_id])
+    meta2 = store.bucket_meta(bucket_id)
+    acl_keys = list(meta2.get("role_acl", {}).keys())
+    assert acl_keys and acl_keys[0] != role_id
+    assert all(len(k) == 64 for k in acl_keys)
+
+    store.bucket_put_role_grant(bucket_id, registry_id, role_id, 1, "eph", "ct")
+    grants_root = tmp_path / "buckets" / bucket_id / "role_grants"
+    assert (grants_root / role_id).exists() is False
+    role_dirs = [p.name for p in grants_root.iterdir() if p.is_dir()]
+    assert role_dirs and all(len(d) == 64 for d in role_dirs)
+
+
+def test_auth_scan_does_not_return_early():
+    class _Mgr:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.admin_checks: list[str] = []
+            self.role_checks: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+
+        def verify_admin(self, rid: bytes, _proof: bytes, _th: bytes) -> bool:
+            self.admin_checks.append(rid.hex())
+            return rid.hex() == ("11" * 32)
+
+        def verify_presentation(self, rid: bytes, role_id: bytes, _proof: bytes, _th: bytes) -> bool:
+            self.role_checks.append((rid.hex(), role_id.hex()))
+            return False
+
+    class _Store:
+        def list_registry_ids(self):
+            return ["11" * 32, "22" * 32]
+
+        def role_ids_for_registry(self, rid_hex: str):
+            if rid_hex == "11" * 32:
+                return ["33" * 32]
+            return ["44" * 32]
+
+        def _registry_tag(self, rid_hex: str):
+            return "r-" + rid_hex[:8]
+
+        def _role_tag(self, role_hex: str):
+            return "k-" + role_hex[:8]
+
+    mgr = _Mgr()
+    auth = fss._authenticate_fs_identity(mgr, _Store(), b"proof", b"nonce")
+    assert auth is not None and auth["is_admin"] is True
+    # Both registries must be checked even though first one matched admin.
+    assert mgr.admin_checks == ["11" * 32, "22" * 32]
+    # Role checks also run for all known role candidates.
+    assert mgr.role_checks == [("11" * 32, "33" * 32), ("22" * 32, "44" * 32)]
+
+
+def test_dispatch_whoami_does_not_expose_registry_or_role():
+    resp = fss._dispatch_fs(
+        {"cmd": "whoami"},
+        store=None,  # not used by whoami branch
+        ctx={
+            "registry_id_hex": "11" * 32,
+            "registry_tag": "r-tag",
+            "role_id_hex": "22" * 32,
+            "role_tag": "k-tag",
+            "is_admin": False,
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp["ok"] is True
+    assert "registry_id" not in resp
+    assert "role_id" not in resp
+    assert resp["auth_scope"] == "credential"