ZKAC/docs/SECURITY.md

# Security model and audit notes (ZKAC 0.3)

This document summarizes the design, residual risks, and recommendations for operators integrating **ZKAC**. It is not a substitute for independent review before high-assurance deployment.

## Goals

- **Authentication:** Only holders of a valid BBS+ credential for a registered role can complete `verify_auth` for that role.
- **Server identity:** The server proves its long-term identity to the client via a Schnorr signature over the session transcript; clients verify against a pinned public key. This prevents MITM attacks without requiring TLS.
- **Confidentiality & integrity:** All traffic (management and authenticated sessions) is authenticated-encrypted (ChaCha20-Poly1305) with keys derived from an ephemeral X25519 handshake.
- **Replay resistance:** Duplicate ciphertexts in a direction are rejected (sliding window + monotonic counter).
- **Unlinkability (credential layer):** BBS+ presentations are unlinkable across sessions when the presentation header (the session transcript hash) differs; the verifier learns only the disclosed attributes (opaque `role_id`, epoch) and validity. Client anonymity is preserved: the client never reveals its long-term key during the handshake.
- **Server cannot forge credentials:** The server stores only the issuer **public** key per role; forging requires the issuer secret key.
- **Opaque server:** The server stores only cryptographically verified state blobs and opaque grant ciphertexts. No user identities, role names, or credential material are stored or visible to the server.

## Cryptographic components

| Layer | Primitive | Purpose |
|-------|-----------|---------|
| Transport | X25519 ephemeral DH, HKDF-SHA256, ChaCha20-Poly1305 | Session keys, AEAD |
| Identity | Schnorr on Ristretto255, BLAKE2b-512 challenge | Server identity binding |
| Credentials | BBS+ on BLS12-381 (zkryptium), SHAKE256 ciphersuite | Blind issuance, ZK presentations |
| Role IDs | BLAKE2b-512 (truncated to 32 bytes) | Opaque role identifiers |
| Grant delivery | X25519 static/ephemeral DH, HKDF-SHA256, ChaCha20-Poly1305 | E2E-encrypted credential grants |

## Protocol flow

### Unified channel (all connections)

```
Client                                Server
  |--- init_msg (eph_pk) ------------>|
  |                                   | accept()
  |                                   | prove_identity() → sign(transcript)
  |<-- response_msg + identity_pkt ---|
  | complete DH                       |
  | decrypt + verify server sig       |
  |===== encrypted session ==========>|
  |--- {op: "mgmt"} or {op: "auth"}->|
```

Management commands (`create_registry`, `post_grant`, etc.) and BBS+ role authentication both run inside the same encrypted, server-authenticated channel. There is no unencrypted management path.

### Grant delivery (admin → recipient, through server)

```
Admin                  Server (opaque relay)        Recipient
  |-- post_grant ------->|                            |
  |   (admin_proof,      | stores only:               |
  |    recipient_pk,     |  {eph_pk, ciphertext}      |
  |    eph_pk,           |  keyed by recipient_pk     |
  |    ciphertext)       |                            |
  |                      |<-- list_grants ------------|
  |                      |--- [{eph_pk, ct}, ...] --->|
  |                      |                            | trial-decrypt
  |                      |<-- claim_grant ------------|
  |                      |  (removes entry)           |
```

## Threats considered

### Network attacker (passive)

- Observes ciphertexts; cannot break ChaCha20-Poly1305 or derive session keys without breaking X25519 / HKDF under standard assumptions.
- Management traffic is indistinguishable from auth traffic at the wire level (same handshake, same framing).

### Network attacker (active / MITM)

- **Server impersonation:** The server signs the session transcript hash with its long-term Ristretto255 key (`prove_identity`). The client verifies this signature against the **pinned** server public key. A MITM running a separate DH exchange produces a different transcript; it cannot forge the server's signature. The client aborts on mismatch.
- **Client impersonation:** The BBS+ presentation is bound to the session transcript hash. A MITM cannot relay a presentation from one session to another (different transcripts) or forge one (requires a valid credential from the issuer).
- **Relay attack:** A MITM that relays the real server's identity proof to a client fails because the proof is encrypted under the MITM-to-server session keys (not the client-to-MITM keys), and the signature is over the wrong transcript.
- **Management channel:** All management commands (registry creation, grants) are protected by the same encrypted channel, eliminating the previous plaintext management path.

### Malicious server

- Can **learn** opaque `role_id`, current epoch, and that *some* valid member authenticated.
- Sees `registry_id` values (needed for routing) but not role names or registry contents beyond opaque state bytes.
- Sees `recipient_pk` for mailbox addressing, plus `eph_pk` and ciphertext per grant, but cannot decrypt grant payloads.
- **Cannot** forge BBS+ credentials without the issuer secret key.
- **Cannot** learn `member_secret` from presentations under the BBS+ security assumptions.
- **Cannot** distinguish which specific member authenticated among valid credential holders (unlinkability holds against the verifier for distinct presentation headers).
- **Cannot** learn the client's long-term public key — it is never transmitted during handshake or auth.
- **Cannot** perform admin operations (registry updates, grant posting) without a valid admin BBS+ credential.
- **Cannot** correlate a recipient's mailbox identity with their authenticated sessions (different keys, unlinkable proofs).

### Malicious client

- Cannot decrypt others' traffic without session keys.
- Cannot produce valid auth for a role without a valid credential + correct epoch + registry entry.

### Denial of service

- **Auth packet size:** Proof length is capped (`MAX_BBS_AUTH_PROOF_BYTES`, 256 KiB) to bound allocations.
- **Handshake:** Fixed 32-byte messages; no variable-length handshake parsing.
- General packet limits should still be enforced at the application layer (total message size, rate limits).

## Key distribution

The server's long-term `PublicKey` (32-byte Ristretto255 point) functions as a **self-authenticating identity** — no certificate authority is required. The client must obtain and pin this key before connecting.

Recommended strategies:

1. **Static configuration** (default): embed the server public key in client config or CLI pin command (`zkac-node server pin`). Equivalent to WireGuard's `[Peer] PublicKey = ...`.
2. **Trust On First Use (TOFU):** accept the server's key on first connection, pin it for subsequent sessions. Risk: first connection is vulnerable.
3. **Out-of-band verification:** compare public key fingerprints over a trusted side channel (phone, in-person, encrypted messaging).
4. **Key registry / directory:** a trusted service maps names to public keys. Shifts trust to the registry and its authentication channel.

## Operational requirements

1. **Issuer secret key:** Protect `BbsIssuer` secret material (HSM, KMS, or encrypted at rest). Compromise = ability to issue arbitrary credentials for that role.
2. **Server long-term key:** Protect the server's `server_key.json`. Compromise = ability to impersonate the server. Rotate the key and distribute the new public key to clients if compromised.
3. **Member storage:** `member_secret` and finalized `Credential` material must be protected; loss = re-enrollment required.
4. **Epoch revocation:** On compromise or policy change, call `set_epoch` and re-issue credentials only to legitimate members; old credentials become invalid at verification time.
5. **Registry integrity:** Registry state is integrity-protected by BBS+ state certificates (admin must sign updates). The server verifies these certificates before accepting changes.
6. **Role ID privacy:** `role_id` is a hash of the role name only if you use `role_id("myrole")`; treat role names as secrets if enumeration is a concern, or derive role IDs with an additional secret salt known to members.
7. **Client identity:** The only persistent client identifier is the issuance public key used for grant mailbox addressing. This key is shared out-of-band with admins; it is not linked to any transport key or BBS+ presentation.

## Implementation notes (audit checklist)

- [x] BBS+ proof verification uses the same header and presentation binding as proof generation (`verify_presentation` in Rust).
- [x] Session transcript is included in the presentation via `present(transcript_hash)`.
- [x] Server identity proof: Schnorr signature over `transcript_hash`, verified against pinned public key before any traffic.
- [x] Schnorr nonce is deterministic (`H(sk || msg)`) — no dependence on RNG quality at signing time.
- [x] Replay protection is symmetric per direction in `Session`.
- [x] Constant-time comparisons are used where critical in transport/replay paths (`subtle` crate).
- [x] Client long-term key is never transmitted, preserving BBS+ unlinkability.
- [x] Management and auth channels use the same encrypted handshake (no plaintext management path).
- [x] Admin proofs in management commands are bound to the session transcript hash (no separate nonce).
- [x] Server stores only opaque state bytes, state certs, and encrypted grant blobs (no role names, no user IDs).
- [ ] **External:** Python bindings surface raw bytes; callers must not log secrets (`secret_key_bytes`, `member_secret`, `prover_blind`).
- [ ] **External:** Use secure randomness from the OS (library uses OS RNG for key generation paths exposed in Rust).

## Design decisions

- **Unified encrypted channel:** All traffic (management and auth) uses the same anonymous handshake. This eliminates the attack surface of an unencrypted management path and simplifies the protocol to a single mode.
- **Anonymous handshake (`complete_connect_anon`):** The client verifies the server's identity but does not authenticate itself during the handshake. BBS+ auth is sent as an application-layer message inside the encrypted session, not as part of the handshake. This allows the same channel for both anonymous management and authenticated role access.
- **Server-only identity proof:** Only the server signs the transcript. Adding client long-term signing would break BBS+ unlinkability (the server could correlate sessions by client public key). Client authentication is handled entirely by the anonymous BBS+ credential.
- **Deterministic Schnorr nonces:** The signing nonce is derived as `H("zkac-schnorr-nonce" || sk || msg)`, eliminating a class of RNG-failure attacks (cf. PS3 ECDSA, Sony 2010). Same key + same message = same signature.
- **Opaque mailbox:** Grant entries on the server contain only `(eph_pk, ciphertext)` — no registry ID or role name. Recipients find their grants by trial-decrypting. This prevents the server from learning which registry or role a grant is for.
- **No user IDs on server:** The server has no concept of user accounts. It is a stateless relay authenticated only by cryptographic proofs.

## Known limitations

- **No post-quantum** primitives: classical security assumptions only.
- **Epoch granularity:** Revocation is coarse (epoch bump); plan issuance and rotation policy accordingly.
- **zkryptium dependency:** Security follows the underlying crate and BLS12-381/BBS+ standards; keep dependencies updated.
- **Key distribution:** The library provides the cryptographic mechanism; initial key distribution is an application-layer responsibility.
- **Mailbox metadata:** The server sees `recipient_pk` as a mailbox address and the number/size/timing of grants. This is inherent to the delivery mechanism.

## Reporting issues

Report security-sensitive findings through your project's private disclosure channel (configure `SECURITY.md` contact or GitHub security advisories when the repository is public).